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Political Economy of Transition 
in Chile 
Raul Laban and Felipe Larrain 
4.1  Introduction 
Since the mid- 1970s, the Chilean economy has suffered a profound transfor- 
mation. From very high levels of protection and pervasive state intervention, it 
has been transformed into an economy integrated to world markets, where the 
engine of  economic growth is the private sector. The process, however, has 
not been smooth on the economic front. Two major depressions-in  1975 and 
1982-83-tested  Chile’s resolve in  continuing free-market reforms, but the 
process endured. Political transition from authoritarian rule to democracy was 
also an important test for the economic model. To some, the opposition’s vic- 
tory in the presidential elections of December 1989 posed grave threats to the 
economy. These fears proved to be wrong, and in the early 1990s Chile’s eco- 
nomic model has been deepened and legitimized in democracy. 
This paper analyzes the economic policies pursued by  the government of 
President Patricio Aylwin, which took office in March 1990, and discusses the 
issue of continuity  and change in the policy regime.  In an attempt to look 
forward, it also touches on the main challenges currently facing the Chilean 
economy. Despite major progress, a significant fraction of the Chilean popula- 
tion still lives below the poverty line. Consolidating a strong and stable path 
of economic growth is an essential component in the defeat of  poverty and 
underdevelopment. Persistent economic growth on the order of 7% per year is 
attainable for Chile, but this requires a higher investment and saving effort. 
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4.2  The Legacy of the Military Regime, 1973-90 
In this section, we briefly review the main economic developments and re- 
forms implemented  during  the  military  regime  (1973-90)  and  describe the 
economic conditions under which Chile returned to democracy after sixteen 
years of authoritarian rule. 
4.2.1 
The Dramatic Changes of the 1970s: The Chilean Transition to Markets 
From the outset of the military regime in late  1973, the Chilean economy 
began the transition to markets by implementing a number of major economic 
and institutional reforms aimed at attaining three different objectives: stabili- 
zation, privatization,  and  liberalization. The first two objectives  were to be 
achieved immediately, while liberalization was supposed to be more gradual. 
Stabilization amounted initially to the elimination of the imbalances in the 
goods markets, induced by an excess of  government  intervention  during the 
previous administration, and in the public sector. By the end of  1974 and dur- 
ing  1975,  the  efforts  concentrated  mainly  on  correcting  the  balance-of- 
payments deficit provoked by the collapse in the world price of copper (Chile’s 
main export) and the tripling of oil prices. Finally, it addressed the control of 
inflation. The stabilization attempt ended by fixing the nominal exchange rate 
in  1979, which was supposed to play the role of  a nominal  anchor for the 
economy. Inflation, however, did not converge to international levels due to 
widespread  indexation  in  labor  and  financial  markets  and  to  an  aggregate 
spending that was expanding faster than output. This caused an important de- 
cline in the real exchange rate and thus in the competitiveness of the tradable 
sector. 
A first round of privatization  (1974-78)  was centered on the divestiture of 
most of the real assets that had been transferred to the state during the Unidad 
Popular administration (1970-73).  By 1980, the public sector remained in con- 
trol of  only forty-three firms (including one commercial bank), compared to 
the more than five hundred firms under state control during President Allende’s 
administration. Privatization was part of a comprehensive attempts to restruc- 
ture the public sector. 
Liberalization involved many reforms aimed at increasing the role of market 
forces in the economy. The starting point was the freeing of most controlled 
prices  in late 1973, followed by  a sweeping deregulation of the domestic fi- 
nancial market and the beginning of extensive trade liberalization. This trend 
was extended to international financial transactions by  the end of the decade 
and especially during the early 1980s. 
Economic Policy in the Authoritarian Era’ 
1. This section draws on Larrain (1991a, 1991b). For a detailed analysis of  economic develop- 
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In  1979, a major labor reform established collective bargaining at the firm 
level, relaxed the prohibition  on dismissals, and restricted  strikes. These re- 
forms to labor legislation reduced the negotiating power of  workers vis-g-vis 
employers (in comparison to the pre-1973 legislation) and were strongly op- 
posed by labor organizations. 
By the beginning of the 1980s, Chile had undergone a deep process of eco- 
nomic restructuring. This embodied a dramatic change in the relative roles of 
the private and public sectors, and increased the role played by markets in the 
allocation of productive resources. At that time, Chile had market-determined 
domestic interest rates and prices (with the exception of public wages and the 
exchange rate), a unified  exchange rate system, a uniform  10% import tariff 
as the only trade barrier (except for automobiles), and a relatively liberalized 
capital market. 
Economic performance experienced  wide fluctuations in the period  1974- 
81. A very large contraction took place during 1974-75,  with GDP declining 
by about 13% and unemployment surging to  16.4% of the labor force in 1975. 
This was attributable not only to the terms of trade loss resulting from the rise 
of oil prices and the fall of copper prices, but also to a sharp decline in domes- 
tic demand as a consequence of  restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, and 
exchange rate devaluation, which sharply reduced real wages-by  15.6% dur- 
ing 1974-75  (see table 4.1). 
It is difficult to identify how much of the reduction in real wages and the 
employment losses was due to the economic reforms implemented at that time 
and how much was due to other shocks. But privatization of state enterprises 
with overemployment and trade liberalization may be expected to induce, at 
least in the short run, a decline in living standards and an increase in unem- 
ployment. 
In 1976-77,  the economy recovered from the 1975 depression and then ex- 
perienced four years of growth at an average rate of 7.5%. The recovery gave 
way to a boom in 1980-81,  spurred by  a major shift in expectations, from a 
realistic  assessment  of  Chile’s  prospects to  an  illusion  of  sustained,  high 
growth.  Unemployment,  however, remained  very  high  during the complete 
period. 
The opening of the capital account and the abundance of foreign credit in 
the late seventies and early eighties provided  the financing necessary for an 
unsustainable  expansion in private expenditures at the time of the boom. By 
late 1981, Chile had accumulated a stock of foreign debt approaching US$16 
billion. The economy was particularly  vulnerable  to an increase in interest 
rates, since almost 60% of the debt was contracted at variable rates, mostly 
tied to the London interbank offered rate, which in 1981 shot up to 16.5% at 
the same time that terms of trade declined by 6%. But the worst would come 
in the following year. 118  Raul Labin and Felipe Larrain 
Table 4.1  Selected Macroeconomic Indicators in Chile, 1970-92 
GDP Growth”  Inflationh  Unemployment‘  Real Wagcsd 
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“Central Bank of Chile. Monthly and quarterly reports. 
bDecember  to December, 1970-78:  CortLzar and Marshall (CIEPLAN: Corporacion de Investiga- 
ciones Economicas para Latinoamerica 1979-92: Central Bank of Chile. 
‘1970-79:  ODEPLAN (National Planning Office); 1980-92:  Instituto Nacional  de Estadisticas 
(INE). Includes emergency unemployment programs (PEM and POJH). 
d1970-73: industrial sector; 1974-92:  aggregate index; Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (INE). 
‘Average annual rates. 
’Preliminary estimates 
Crisis,  Adjustment, Recoveiy, and Growth (1982-89) 
In 1982-83,  Chile experienced  its worst economic crisis since the  1930s, 
with real output collapsing by  15%. This major depression was partly a result 
of  several external shocks: the drying up of  voluntary external financing, the 
deterioration of 23% in the terms of trade since 1980, and the major increase 
in foreign interest rates. But the impact of external developments was exacer- 
bated by several domestic policy mishandlings: the fixed exchange rate policy 
coupled with mandatory indexation  of  wages at  100% of  past  inflation; the 
sweeping opening of  the capital account at the time of  the boom; the radical 
liberalization of  domestic financial  markets without  the provision  of  proper 119  Chile: Continuity, Change, and Transition 
regulations and controls; and the belief in the “automatic adjustment” mecha- 
nism, by which policymakers expected the market to produce a quick adjust- 
ment to the new recessionary conditions without interference by the author- 
ities. 
The government  initially  responded  to the  1982 external  payments crisis 
with a contractionary adjustment policy during 1982-83,  aimed at closing the 
income-expenditure  gap. Output dropped  during both  years, the unemploy- 
ment rate reached over 30% of the labor force in 1983, and real wages declined 
by  almost  11  % during this period. In addition, the exchange rate policy was 
erratic, as shown by the implementation of five different exchange rate regimes 
after  the  abandonment  of  the  fixed  exchange  rate  policy  in  June  1982. 
The external disequilibrium was reduced in 1983, but the economy continued 
to be depressed. This is not surprising, since most of the adjustment to Chile’s 
external crisis occurred initially  through import reduction induced by an ag- 
gregate  expenditure  contraction,  while  substitution  effects  in  demand  and 
exports showed little response. In  1983, imports were less than 50% of their 
1981 level. 
In order to prevent the high costs that the adjustment program was inducing, 
the government pursued  an expansionary policy during most of  1984, which 
helped  to achieve a recovery  in output but proved  to be unsustainable. The 
current account deficit almost doubled,  surpassing US$2 billion-  10.7% of 
GDP. In September of that year, the exchange rate was devalued and tariffs 
were raised, in order to induce a switch in expenditure toward domestic goods. 
At the beginning of  1985, a new macroeconomic policy was implemented. 
Its  aim was  to promote  a recovery  of  output  and employment  through  the 
export-oriented structural adjustment of the economy. Policy actions centered 
on three fronts: the promotion of noncopper exports, the enhancement of do- 
mestic saving and investment, and the strengthening of  the corporate and fi- 
nancial sectors. 
The heavy burden of a foreign debt in excess of GDP required a vigorous 
effort to promote exports. At the same time, the need to diversify exports be- 
yond copper had been recognized, and a process of export diversification had 
been under way since the midseventies. To strengthen this effort, the authori- 
ties relied on several policies: a series of devaluations restored first the loss in 
international competitiveness suffered during the fixed exchange rate period 
(1979-82),  and were followed by the stabilization of the real exchange rate at 
a competitive level; import tariffs were reduced  from 35% to  15% in three 
steps; and various fiscal and administrative measures were effected, including 
a  10% import duties rebate  on minor exports and  an  acceleration of  exist- 
ing tax refunds for exporters. While these measures were primarily oriented 
toward exports, they also provided an incentive for efficient import substitu- 
tion stemming from the high level of the real exchange rate. 
During  1985-89  the volume of exports of goods and services expanded at 
an average annual rate of  10.5%, and Chile became one of the countries with 120  Raul Laban and Felipe Larrain 
Table 4.2  Evolution of Imports, Exports, and the Real Exchange Rate, 1980-92 
Import Volume'  Export Volumed 
Real Exchange 
% of  Annual Rate  9% of  Annual Rate  Rateh 
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"Import and exports of  goods and  services in  1977 pesos, National  Accounts, Central Bank of 
Chile. 
bEffective  real exchange rate, Central Bank of Chile 
"Preliminary projections. 
higher outward orientation, as exports of goods and services accounted in 1989 
for 29.4% of GDP, compared to 23.6% in 1980 (see table 4.2 and figure 4.1). 
National  saving reached  a remarkable  low of  1.6% of GDP in  1982. As 
foreign saving became severely limited, it was imperative to improve the do- 
mestic effort in order to finance higher levels of investment. At a broad level, 
the restoration of  macroeconomic  stability was essential to increase saving. 
But specific policies were  also pursued. The tax reform of  December  1984 
promoted corporate saving through a radical reduction in the tax rate affecting 
retained earnings. Attempting to encourage household saving, the reform also 
allowed a reduction from the tax base of 20% of certain qualified investments. 
Public revenues  were hurt by the depressed economic activity, the social 
security reform of mid-1981 (which required increased public contributions to 
the state social security system), the  1984 tax reform (which significantly re- 
duced direct taxation), and the reduction of 20% of import tariffs. 
In view of weakened public finances, the government implemented a series 
of measures to improve its financial position. Wage adjustments in the public 
sector were set systematically below  inflation,  and social  security disburse- 
ments ceased to be adjusted automatically to lagged inflation.  Several other 
categories of current and capital expenditures were also curtailed. 
During  1982-83,  nonfinancial corporations had become very weak-some 
outright insolvent-as  a consequence of extremely high real interest rates, the 
effects of currency devaluation on dollar-denominated debt, and the economic 121  Chile: Continuity, Change, and Transition 
depression. These factors, coupled with faulty banking practices in a permis- 
sive regulatory environment, set the stage for a major crisis in the financial 
sector, requiring regulators to assume control of  several troubled financial in- 
stitutions, including the two largest private commercial banks. 
In the short run, the government reacted to the crisis with a substantial aid 
package for banks and local debtors. This package included a preferential ex- 
change rate for dollar debts, at times 40% below the official rate; credit lines 
at below-market rates for the financial sector; and the Central Bank’s purchase 
of bad loans from the banking system with a repurchase agreement, which also 
involved a subsidy. The various programs were phased out by the end of  1986, 
but their cost was substantial for the public sector. The total value of subsidies 
for financial rehabilitation  was estimated at approximately US$6 billion, or 
about 35% of  1986 GDP. In an attempt to avoid the mistakes of  the earlier 
financial liberalization, bank regulation was strengthened, and the regulatory 
powers of  the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions were en- 
hanced. By mid- 1985, the authorities started a major recapitalization program 
for private banks. 
During the second half of  the  1980s, a second round of  privatization was 
carried out. A total of  forty-six firms-a  number of financial institutions that 
were intervened in by the government to keep them from bankruptcy after the 
economic and financial crisis-were  sold to the private sector for slightly over 
US$3 billion. This process was relatively rapid, given the large number of firms 
and the volume of the assets sold. 
Macroeconomic  performance significantly improved after  1984. In  1985, 
the economy started a sustained recovery, accompanied by  a steady improve- 
RER Average  1980 - 100  Exports as % of  GDP 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Real Exchange Rate 
Fig. 4.1  Exports and real exchange rate, 1980-92 
Source: Central Bank of Chile, monthly and quarterly reports. 
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ment in the external accounts. These results came from a combination of inter- 
nal and external factors. Internally, the structural adjustment program was ac- 
companied by  macroeconomic  stability, which enabled response to the new 
policies. The fiscal deficit declined from 4.3% of GDP in  1984 to about bal- 
ance in 1989. On the external front, the decline of world interest rates during a 
good part of the program and the improvement of the terms of trade in 1986-89 
certainly helped the current account and economic growth. 
The structural adjustment program was quite successful in the promotion of 
noncopper exports and the efficient substitution of imports. The combination 
of  a competitive real exchange rate,  low and flat tariffs, and  specific fiscal 
incentives produced a strong response from nontraditional exports. At the same 
time, the generalized economic recovery strengthened substantially both the 
financial and nonfinancial sectors. 
4.2.2  Income Distribution, Poverty, and the Military Regime’s 
Economic Policy 
The record in terms of income distribution during the authoritarian period 
points  toward  a  deterioration,  both  during  the  restructuring  process of  the 
1970s and through most of the structural adjustment process of the 1980s. This 
is not surprising, given the two sharp depressions that Chile experienced  in 
this period and the painful adjustments that followed. In each case, real wages 
declined significantly  and unemployment increased to unprecedented  levels. 
Additionally,  some of  the economic  measures adopted during these periods 
had a regressive bias. 
It has been shown that the income of the poor is very accurately explained 
by the unemployment rate and the wage index. On the whole, wages in Chile 
declined more than per capita output, and unemployment was quite high on 
average.z It is likely, then, that income distribution worsened. 
Several measures confirm this trend in income distribution. The Gini coef- 
ficient increased from around 0.50 in 1970 to more than 0.54 during 1982-84. 
The share in national  income of  the highest quintile increased steadily from 
55.8% in  1970 to 59.5% in  1982-84,  while the income share of  the poorest 
two quintiles declined from 11.5% in 1970  to 10%  in 1982-84. The worst point 
of  income distribution happened,  then,  at the  height of  the depression (see 
table 4.3)’  In 1989, however, the share of the bottom 40% had climbed back 
to  12.6%, while  the top  20% had retained  its 59.5% share; this suggests a 
recovery of income distribution in the second half of the 1980s. 
A number of social expenditure items were severely affected by the adjust- 
ment to the economic and financial crisis, especially in the  first half of  the 
2. The average rate of  unemployment  increased  from  6.5%  in  the  1960s to  17.3% during 
3. For a more detailed discussion on the distributive impact of  the adjustment program carried 
1974-89. 
out in the 1980s in the Chilean economy, see Larrain (1991b) and Meller (1991). 123  Chile: Continuity, Change, and Transition 
Table 4.3  Income Distribution in Chile: Selected Years, 1970-92 
Gini  Share of  Income" 
Coefficient  Real Wage  Unemployment 
of Family  Lowest  Middle  Highest  Indexh  Rate' 
Years  Income"  40%  40%  20%  (1970=100)  (%) 
1970  0.500  11.5  32.7  55.8  100.0  5.7 
1979-81  0.523  11.1  31.3  57.6  93.8  16.5 
1982-84d  0.543  10.0  30.5  59.5  94.7  27.4 
1989  12.6  27.9  59.5  97.6  6.3 
1990  13.3  28.7  58.0  99.4  6.0 
1991  14.7  30.6  54.7  104.3  6.5 
199F  109.0  4.9 
Source: INE: Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas. Monthly report. 
'Meller (1  99  1). 
hCentral  Bank of Chile. Monthly report. 
TortriZar and Marshall (1980). 
"he  share of income of different groups corresponds to 1982-83 
'Preliminary projections. 
1980s. Thus, the per capita health, housing, and education budgets declined 
by more than 20% during the adjustment to the crisis of the 1980s. 
The  economic  crisis  and  the  policies  directed  to  close  the  income- 
expenditure gap pushed the unemployment rate to over 30%-including  emer- 
gency employment programs (PEM [program  de empleo minimo, minimum 
employment program] and POJH [programa de ocupacidn para obreros jefes 
de hogaz  employment program for heads of family])-in  1983, with unem- 
ployment remaining over 24%  for almost four years (1982-85); real wages 
declined by 20% for at least five years, and minimum real wages dropped 40% 
during 1981-85. 
Revenues of the public health system were also hurt with the privatization 
of middle- and high-income health care. When the option to switch to the pri- 
vate health institutions was given, 8% of the affiliates did so and carried with 
them 40% of the revenues of the public entity. While the reform certainly in- 
creased the quality of service for those who switched, the lower income groups 
suffered significantly from the decline in resources of the state system. 
The military regime implemented several correct principles in the social sec- 
tors, such as targeting to the lower income groups, and decentralization and 
competition in the provision of social services. These principles found con- 
crete application in successful programs such as free distribution of milk and 
attention to pregnant women, which influenced the sharp reduction in the coun- 
try's infant mortality rate."  Nonetheless, this effort was not sufficient. A high 
4. For a thorough-and  favorable-analysis  of social policies during the military government, 
see Castaiieda (1990). 124  Raul Laban and Felipe Larrain 
proportion  of  Chileans-estimated  at around 45% by Torche (1987)-were 
living below the poverty level in the mid-1980s. Although poverty in Chile is 
not a new problem, this high proportion was, to a significant extent, the result 
of the 1982-83  depression and the adjustment pattern that followed. The eco- 
nomic recovery and the resumption of growth in 1986-88  improved this situa- 
tion, but it takes decades of economic expansion to break the circle of poverty. 
4.2.3  The Legacy of the Military Regime 
It is widely recognized that the first democratically elected government after 
sixteen years of military rule in Chile inherited, in general terms, a very suc- 
cessful economy. This stands as a major contrast to other experiences of transi- 
tion in the region. 
At the end of the military government, the Chilean economy had been suc- 
cessful in completing its stabilization and structural adjustment. The country 
was a leader in the implementation of a number of economic reforms-trade 
and  social  security  reforms  and  privatization,  among  others.  The last  half 
decade of  the  military  regime was also the  subperiod with better economic 
performance. During 1985-89,  real GDP expanded at an average rate of 6.2%, 
inflation averaged 19.8%, the volume of exports expanded at an average annual 
rate of  10.5%, and the government was able to achieve a fiscal surplus of over 
1% of GDP in 1989. 
Nevertheless, as we just discussed, this success was not painless. The struc- 
tural adjustment process carried out during this period resulted in significant 
costs. Available information is robust in pointing out a deterioration of income 
distribution during this period and the fact that the transition to democracy was 
initiated in the context of a high share of the population living in poverty. 
By the end of the military regime, poverty had also become a very significant 
concern in public opinion. According to a September 1988 poll conducted by 
a prestigious private academic institution (Centro de Estudios Xblicos, CEP), 
poverty and low income levels were the principal reasons behind the vote for 
the “no” option in the plebiscite of October 1988, which cleared the way for 
competitive presidential and congressional elections held in December 1989. 
4.3  Economic Policies of the Aylwin Administration 
The government of President Aylwin, a center-left coalition known as Con- 
certacih, was elected with an absolute majority in December 1989 and went 
into office in March 1990. The new administration started from a strong posi- 
tion on the economic front and maintained the economic model inherited from 
the previous regime. This produced a climate of  stability in economic policy 
and institutions, necessary for strong private investment and sustained growth. 
The democratic legitimization of the free-market economic model adopted 
by the previous regime was crucial. To attain this goal the government had to 
gain, in a short period of time, support for policy continuity from organized 125  Chile: Continuity, Change, and Transition 
labor and from those that were hit worst during the prolonged adjustment pro- 
cess of the  1980s. Among the latter were those earning the minimum wage, 
which was, at the beginning of  1990, 35% lower than its real value for 1980; 
those receiving family allowances (which had not been adjusted since 1985), 
whose  purchasing  power in  1990 was a third  of  that  in  1980; the  average 
worker, whose real wage in 1989 was 1.6% lower than its average real wage in 
1980-81;  those receiving public sector pensions, which declined  10% in real 
terms from  1985 to early  1990; recipients of  the subsidy for extremely poor 
families, which declined 50% in real terms between 1981 and 1989; and bene- 
ficiaries of  social spending, which went down 20% in per capita terms since 
1985. Clearly, the  adjustment of the economy from the  deep depression  of 
1982-83 had not been painless, but the economy was at the beginning of  1990 
in a solid position to improve the situation of people. 
The Aylwin administration was able to create a climate of consensus in the 
conduct of economic policy, which was central to shape the reforms that were 
implemented and to design the development strategy that was to be followed 
during this period. This strategy was built on four widely accepted principles. 
First, the market was to play the leading role in the allocation of resources and 
in the distribution of goods and services. Second, the maintenance of macro- 
economic stability (building on fiscal austerity and monetary discipline) was 
crucial to ensure sustainable growth. Third, there  was a commitment to in- 
crease social spending in health, housing, pensions, and education. Lastly, it 
was recognized that external markets provide the best opportunities for small 
economies, and thus the government must try to maintain a competitive real 
exchange rate and make efforts to increase the integration of the Chilean econ- 
omy to the international markets in goods, services, and capital. 
4.3.1 
Managing Social Demands under Macroeconomic Equilibrium 
The new democratic government faced several potential pressures from dif- 
ferent groups of the population. An attempt to give in to all demands would 
have only produced  short-term benefits  at the cost of  sacrificing macroeco- 
nomic stability and future growth. One need only witness the problems of Ar- 
gentina, Brazil, and Peru in reconciling the different claims that arose with the 
restoration of democracy. 
There was a wide agreement in the government and the opposition that the 
only way  to allow a larger fraction of the population to benefit permanently 
from modernization, and to defeat poverty, was through sustained growth. But 
waiting for growth alone to eliminate poverty takes too long to be a viable 
solution ethically and politically. And growth does not necessarily come with 
improved  income distribution in its earlier stages. If  a large fraction of  the 
population  waits for years for the benefits of modernization, this process may 
be politically unsustainable in democracy. If perceived in this way by investors, 
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such a postponement will ultimately limit, despite attractive fundamentals,  the 
supply response to investment incentives until at least some of the uncertainty 
about the sustainability of pro-investment policies is res01ved.~ 
Given  the irreversible  nature  of  productive  real  investment,  stability and 
credibility in economic institutions and a solid basis of support for policy con- 
tinuity may be more important to stimulate private investment than tax incen- 
tives and “high” ex ante rates of  return. Put in other words, if there is a high 
degree of uncertainty in the economic-political environment, tax breaks and ex 
ante rates of return will have to be very attractive in order to have an important 
impact on the  accumulation  of  physical  capital  (Dornbusch  1990; Pindyck 
1991). Thus, an important cost associated with political and economic instabil- 
ity is its depressive impact on productive investment, and thus on economic 
growth. 
The new administration avoided the conflict between macroeconomic stabil- 
ity and increased resources devoted to the lower-income groups in two ways: 
(1) changing  the  composition  of  government  spending, whereas  the share 
of social spending in the government budget during 1990-9 1 was 3.4 percent- 
age points higher than in  1988-89$  and (2) implementing  a tax reform that 
would  contribute additional  resources  for social  spending, as  analyzed  in 
section 4.3.2. 
In addition, the government sent to Congress a labor reform in 1990, partly 
intended to balance negotiating power between employees and employers, and 
raised  the  minimum  wage,  the family allowance,  and the subsidy  for low- 
income families  during  1990-92.  These  adjustments  were  set in  national 
agreements among the government, the major representatives of organized la- 
bor (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, CUT), and of entrepreneurs (Confedera- 
ci6n de la Produccicin y el Comercio, CPC), which allowed for a 21.9% rise in 
the real minimum wage between March 1990 and March 1992.’ In April 1991, 
the government, CPC, and CUT agreed that, after this first stage of recovery, 
further real increases in the minimum wage should be related to gains in labor 
productivity,  and that future expected inflation  (as opposed to past inflation) 
should be used as the criterion for nominal adjustments. 
Although the minimum wage has a coverage of only 12% of the labor force 
and there are no mandatory wage changes, its adjustment serves as a “signal” 
of inflationary expectations for the rest of the economy. Thus, the use of future 
expected inflation  to set the minimum wage, which was in fact the criterion 
used in the 1992 negotiations, is an important contribution to breaking index- 
5. “Pessimistic” expectations  may  be  self-fulfilling. The wait-and-see strateg? deprives the 
economy of much needed investment, thus retarding growth and eroding the politid support for 
policy continuity. Ultimately, this may bring about the reversal of pro-investment pdicies initially 
feared (Labin and Wolf  1993). 
6. Some significant inflexibilities were built into the budget,  such as  the impssibility-by 
law-of  reducing defense spending in real terms. 
7. The minimum wage was in March  1992, however, still  12% below its avenge real value 
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ation to past inflation (widely used in labor and financial contracts) and there- 
fore inflationary  inertia. The negotiations of public and minimum wages for 
1993 were also based on expected inflation. 
There was some room for wage improvement at the beginning of the demo- 
cratic government, but it was necessary  to be cautious  in this  area. Several 
important reasons suggested restraint from wage increases beyond productivity 
improvements.  First,  even though  unemployment  was  significantly  reduced 
during 1988-89, the economy hit productive capacity constraints; thus, to sus- 
tain low levels of  unemployment,  the required  increase in investment put a 
strict limit on real wage adjustments beyond productivity improvements. Sec- 
ond, real wages recovered  significantly  in  1988 and  1989, increasing by  an 
accumulated 8.5% over this two-year period. This was a clear indication of a 
tightening labor market, which through its own workings would further in- 
crease wages as long as the economic expansion continued. Third, there were 
doubts about the impact that the labor and tax reforms would have on the pri- 
vate sector and thus on the capacity of the economy to create enough produc- 
tive employments. Some economists predicted that the combined effect of the 
rigidities that the labor reform would introduce, and the reduction of incentives 
to invest for firms that the tax reform would imply, would reduce the capacity 
of the economy to create productive employments and thus would result in a 
higher “equilibrium” level of unemployment. 
The experience  of  other countries in Latin  America  helped  Chile in this 
respect.  Aggressive  wage  adjustments  have  proved  short-lived  and  have 
quickly resulted in sharp wage contractions, as figure 4.2 shows for Argentina, 
Brazil, and Peru in the 1980s. In the first two cases, the rise lasted for just one 
year and then gave way to an enormous contraction that soon left workers with 
lower real wages than before the start of  the expansion. In Peru, wages in- 
creased for two years and then suffered a major setback that left them substan- 
tially below their initial level in  1985. Thus it is in the collective interest of 
workers to avoid this pattem8 
During the first three years  of President Aylwin’s administration, average 
wages and the minimum wage are expected to grow approximately by  12% 
and 28% in real terms, respe~tively.~  At the end of  1992, the unemployment 
rate is projected  to be around 4.5%,  almost 2 percentage  points below  that 
attained in 1989. At the same time, fiscal social spending rose an accumulated 
8. Dornbusch (1989b) has argued that an artificial rise in real wages makes labor gain at the 
expense of capital. This has a negative impact on capital formation and may even induce capital 
flight. Thus the initial increase in real wages is partially dampened by  a decline in the capital 
stock, so that the level of real wages that can be sustained in equilibrium may be lower than when 
this process started. For an analysis of the populist cycle, see Dornbusch and Edwards (1991) and 
Sachs (1990). 
9. This rise in the average real wage is explained mainly by three elements: the increase in labor 
demand due to the expansion in economic activity, the decline in inflation, and the increase in real 
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Fig. 4.2  Real wage index (year 1 = 100) 
Source: Larrain  1991a. 
20.5% real during 1990-91,'O  and it is expected to increase even further during 
the period  1992-93.  Per capita fiscal social spending in the 1993 budget law 
is 40% higher in real terms than that stipulated in the 1990 budget law inherited 
from the military government. As agreed with CUT and CPC, the government 
has also implemented other measures directed to raise the income of poor fam- 
ilies, such as increase in family allowances, subsidy to low-income families, 
payment of the 10.6% adjustment in the minimum pension that was not ful- 
filled in 1985, and wage rises to public sector teachers and health workers. 
Higher wages and lower unemployment are bound to improve income distri- 
bution. Preliminary information suggests that income distribution improved 
during the first two and a half years of the Aylwin government. Estimates show 
that the income share of  the richest 20% declined from 59.5% at the end of 
1989 to 54.7% in 1991, which is the lowest level since 1970, while the lowest 
40% of the population increased its share to 14.7%, the highest since 1970; the 
middle 40% of the families increased their share by 2.7 percentage points with 
respect to 1989. Nevertheless, there is still much to be done in Chile to improve 
income distribution and to reduce the still high share of the population living 
under the poverty line. 
Cooperation with the government from organized labor, entrepreneurial as- 
sociations, and the main opposition party (Renovacion Nacional ")  has been 
10. This increase of  public social spending can be decomposed into a 35.7% increase in health, 
54.5% rise in housing, 8.2% increase in education, 21.6% rise in pensions, and 17.3% increase in 
other social items. 
1 1. Renovacion Nacional backed both the tax reform and the labor reform. as discussed below. 129  Chile: Continuity, Change, and Transition 
crucial in the preservation of macroeconomic stability and in the implementa- 
tion of a social plan directed to integrate lower-income groups in a permanent 
way in the development process during the Aylwin administration. 
Conducting Monetary Policy under High Capital Mobility 
The new authorities thought that Chile could not sustain the high rates of 
GDP expansion  it had experienced in  1988 (7.4%) and especially in  1989 
(10%). They  also considered the cumulative  rates  of  expansion  of  private 
money (85%)  and of domestic expenditure (23%)  during 1988-89 to be unsus- 
tainable. This rapid expansion of  aggregate demand had induced an increase 
in imports of 35% in value terms during 1989. In their view, the country was 
running the serious risk of  an inflationary outburst.'2 The annualized rate of 
inflation reached 30% in the last quarter of  1989, and showed an upward trend. 
Nonetheless,  the  monthly  indicator  of  economic  activity  (1MACEC)-a 
widely watched index in the country-showed  that the economy was deceler- 
ating since the last quarter of  1989 (see table 4.4 and figure 4.3). 
In early  1990, the Central Bank engineered a sharp monetary contraction 
aimed at reducing aggregate expenditure, and thus to moderate the rise of im- 
ports and to control inflation. Ex ante real interest rates on ten-year Central 
Bank bonds were raised from less than 7% in the last quarter of  1989 to 9.7% 
at  the beginning  of  1990. At the  same time,  the  monetary  authorities  an- 
nounced that the adjustment would be transitory, which indicated the prospect 
of substantial capital gains once interest rates declined to normal levels. Enthu- 
siasm to acquire Central Bank bonds was immense, and the stock of Central 
Bank debt increased by  80% between December 1989 and December 1990. 
Attracted by high interest rates on long-term Central Bank bonds-which  were 
offered through an open window-many  funds invested on shorter-term in- 
struments were shifted to longer-term instruments, and annual short-term real 
rates surged, from 6%  at the beginning of 1989 to 13.3% in March 1990, their 
highest level since 198  1. 
The adjustment was vastly complicated by international capital mobility.I3 
Spreads between  local  interest  rates  and  international  rates  increased  so 
sharply that short-term speculative capital flew massively to Chile. As a result, 
during the first half of  1990 the nominal exchange rate went from the upper 
limit of its 10% fluctuation band to the bottom of the band and remained there 
for the rest of the year. Moreover, the monetary authority had to purchase dol- 
lars in order to defend the floor of the band. As a result of this intervention in 
the foreign exchange market, the Central Bank ended up accumulating US$2.4 
billion in reserves during 1990. To control the consequent rise in the monetary 
base, the bank sterilized the effects of foreign exchange operations by  selling 
12. According to estimates by Marfan (1992). any excess productive capacity generated during 
13. On capital mobility in Chile, see Labh  and Larrain (1993). 
the prolonged adjustment process of the 1980s had been exhausted by  1989. Table 4.4  Macroeconomic Quarterly Data for Chile, 1989-92  (%) 





















































































Source: Central Bank of  Chile. 
*Average twelve-month rate of growth. 
bQuarterly average. 
'Preliminary projections. 
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more of its own bonds, preventing in this way a faster decline in interest rates. 
As  a consequence, its balance sheet deteriorated:  foreign exchange earned 
international  interest  rates,  while  Central Bank  bonds paid  a  much  higher 
peso rate. 
The adjustment was costly in terms of  output-GDP  growth in 1990 was 
only 2.1  %-but  it served the monetary authority as a genuine proof that it was 
willing to pay  a cost to fight what was regarded as an overheated economy, 
and thus to preserve macroeconomic equilibrium. Its contractionary effects, 
however, were milder on other variables and were soon reversed. The unem- 
ployment rate went from an average 6.2% during 1990-91 to an expected 4.8% 
by the end of  1992; real wages increased an accumulated 6.8% during 1990- 
91, and are expected to increase by 4.5% in  1992. An important increase in 
social  spending and  other  government programs  directed  to  lower-income 
groups also helped to mitigate the costs of the adjustment. 
Fiscal Policy 
Fiscal policy during the current government has been highly responsible, 
especially if  compared to other transitions to democracy in the region. The 
government has spent no more than its income, generating a surplus in the 
consolidated nonfinancial public sector. Real government spending, however, 
increased at rates higher than GDP growth in 1991 (13.5%), while in 1992 it 
is expected to increase at a rate similar to GDP. Although the budgets approved 
by  Congress  have  contemplated  more  moderate  expansions,  higher-than- 
projected revenues have enabled the government to spend more than budgeted 
without going into deficit. 
Fiscal revenue has increased significantly during 1990-92,  due to the tax 
reform of  1990, a strong expansion of economic activity and imports, a rela- 
tively high price of copper, and a reduction in tax evasion. In addition to low 
international interest rates, this has allowed the government to increase its so- 
cial spending while generating enough saving to finance its investment and 
have a surplus in each of these three years. For 1990-9 1, the nonfinancial pub- 
lic sector attained an average surplus of  1.5% of GDP-3.1%  of  GDP if we 
add the copper stabilization fund. Expectations for 1992 are that the nonfinan- 
cia1 public sector will show a surplus of more than 2% of GDP. At the same 
time, comparing the expected execution for 1992 and the budget law for 1990, 
social spending and central government investment will increase by  30% and 
53% in real terms, re~pective1y.l~ 
At the same time, the increase in social spending has been accompanied by 
a higher saving effort by the government. Nonfinancial public sector saving, 
which was on average 4.5% of GDP in the 1980s, rose from 5.0% of GDP in 
1990 to 5.9% in 1991; in the first semester of  1992 it showed an increase in 
14. The 1993 budget law (currently in congressional discussion) stipulates a real increase of 
almost 18% in government investment and of 7.6%  in social spending. 132  Raul Laban and Felipe Larrain 
real terms with respect to the same semester of  1991. Private saving has also 
increased, reaching  12.8% of GDP on average in  1990-91,  which is almost 
double the average for the 1980s-6.9%  (see table 4.5). 
Nevertheless, the public sector’s contribution to national saving has been 
partially dampened by  an operational deficit at the Central Bank, which was 
3.9% of GDP on average during  1983-89.  Originally, this resulted from the 
government’s intervention to avoid massive bankruptcies during the crisis of 
the early 1980s. After declining year by year since 1986, this quasi-fiscal defi- 
cit reached 2.1  % of GDP in 1990, as the Central Bank suffered important oper- 
ational losses to defend its nominal exchange rate policy and prevent a faster 
appreciation  of  the real exchange rate. This quasi-fiscal deficit declined to 
1.3% of GDP during 1991 and is expected to decline even further in 1992 (see 
table 4.5). 
The current government has contributed to this reduction in the quasi-fiscal 
deficit. Since  1990, the Aylwin administration  has made extraordinary pre- 
payments of more than US$600 million to the Central Bank, and the  1993 
budget stipulates a prepayment of US135 million. This has allowed the gov- 
ernment to increase the consolidated public sector surplus in a politically via- 
ble way (increasing expenditure through prepayments), because, given the so- 
cial needs of the population, it is politically costly for the government to show 
a high nonfinancial public sector surplus. 
The strength of Chile’s public finances is in sharp contrast to the situation 
of  other economies, both in the developed and developing world. Countries 
with different degrees of development and diverse economic policies, and with 
governments of  different  political  orientation,  are fighting to reduce public 
deficits. In many cases, they have to reduce significantly social spending and 
public investment, placing a high welfare cost on those with lower income and 
negatively affecting long-term growth prospects. Estimates for the principal 
Table 4.5  Saving and Investment in the Chilean Economy, 1980-92 
(% of nominal GDP) 
Saving 
Year  Investment  Foreign  Domestic  NFPS’  Central Bank  Private 
1980-89b  16.9  7.0  9.9  5.3  -2.4  7.0 
1990- 9  1  19.5  1.3  18.2  7.1  -1.7  12.8 
1990  20.2  2.8  17.4  7.5  -2.1  12.0 
1991  18.8  -0.2  19.0  6.6  -1.3  13.6 
1992’  21.0  3.5  18.5 
Source: Central Bank of Chile, Ministry of  Finance. 
”NFPS  =nonfinancial public sector (includes Banco del Estado, the only commercial bank owned 
by the Chilean government). 
bAverage. 
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industrialized countries (OECD 1992) indicate that they will have fiscal defi- 
cits averaging 3% of GDP in 1992, with the exception only of Japan, which has 
a s~rplus.'~  Developing countries (including eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet 
Union), on the other hand, are expected to attain an average deficit of more 
than 4% of  GDP (International Monetary Fund  1992). This same pattern is 
observed across geographic locations in developing countries; in  1992, fiscal 
deficits, as a share of GDP, are expected to be 3.7% in Africa, 2.1% in Asia, 
6.7% in Europe, 6.4% in the Middle East, and 1  % in Latin America. 
Macroeconomic PerJ?ormance 
Higher  interest  rates  had  significant  real  effects  in  the  economy. GDP 
growth decelerated from 10% in 1989 to a mere 2.1% in  1990. Paradoxically, 
inflation increased to 27.3% in 1990. This was greatly influenced by the effects 
of the Gulf War, which were quickly passed through to consumers. After high 
inflation rates in September and October (between 3% and 5% per month), 
inflation slowed down in the last two months of  1990, and declined to 18.7% 
in  1991. It is expected to decline to about  13% during 1992 (see table 4.1). 
Official projections point to a further decline in  1993 (around 11%), but this 
looks quite hard to achieve. 
The rate of fixed capital formation declined from 19.5% of GDP in 1990 to 
18.2% in  1991, and then rebounded  to around 20% in  1992.16 The drop of 
investment in 1991 was quite moderate; in our view, it responded mostly to the 
monetary contraction of  1990, while the tax and labor reforms-implemented 
also in  1990-had  little to do with it. The unemployment rate, after having 
dropped consistently in the second half of the 1980s from its heights of almost 
30%  in 1982, reached an average of 6.2% during 1990-91, and it will be below 
5% by the end of  1992. At the same time, real wages have increased by  an 
accumulated 6.8% during 1990-91, and they are expected to rise by about 4% 
during 1992 (see table 4.1). 
During 1990-92,  domestic saving will attain an average of  18.6% of GDP, 
the highest in the last three decades. Although a stronger saving effort is still 
needed, this helps to set the basis for sustainable long-term growth. In this 
period, domestic saving will finance-on  average-more  than 90% of domes- 
tic investment, compared to only 41.4% in the 1980s. This will help to reduce 
the vulnerability of the Chilean economy to external shocks, which tradition- 
ally have accounted for a large fraction of the fluctuation that has characterized 
the country's growth process. 
The external accounts have been very strong too. During 1990-91, the bal- 
ance of payments showed a surplus, expected to be repeated in 1992 and in 
15. Without considering the significant surplus in the social security system, however, Japan's 
16. The rate of  capital formation in  1990 was the highest since  1981, when it  also reached 
general government is also expected to have a deficit of  around 3% of GDP in 1992. 
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1993. The 1990 surplus was explained mainly by a large capital account sur- 
plus due to both an important inflow of medium- and long-term capital in the 
form of  credits and direct foreign inve~tment,'~  and an inflow of  short-term 
speculative capital attracted by an interest rate differential that more than com- 
pensated  for devaluation expectations and any other source of  risk. During 
1991, Chile experienced a small current account surplus--0.2%  of GDP-the 
first since 1976. This was explained by a large trade surplus of around US$1.5 
billion (an increase of almost 20% with respect to 1990), despite a reduction 
in tariffs from 15% to 11  % in June 1991 and a decline of almost 9% in the real 
exchange rate. Exports have continued to grow fast, accumulating an increase 
of  10.5% during 1990-91;  noncopper exports rose by  19.7% over the same 
period. In real terms, exports of goods and services accumulated an increase 
of  21.6% during  1990-9 1, increasing the outward orientation of  the Chilean 
economy. In 1991, exports accounted for 33% of GDP, compared to 23.6% and 
29.4% in  1980 and  1989, respectively. Foreign  exchange reserves  stood at 
US$9 billion at the end of  1992, equivalent to over one-quarter of  GDP, or 
almost twelve months of imports.'B 
4.3.2  The Tax Reform Package of  1990 
The program of  the Concertaci6n  government contemplated a tax reform 
that could increase available resources for social programs in education, health, 
housing, and nutrition. The government understood that running a fiscal deficit 
to finance these programs would endanger the much-prized macroeconomic 
stability. This could result in increased inflation that disproportionately hurts 
those with lower income, who receive an important part of  their income in 
nominal terms and have far less access to inflation-proof assets. Higher infla- 
tion could also threaten national saving and investment and, in this way, the 
prospects for future growth and social welfare. 
A large majority of the country shared the objective of helping the less well- 
off. A minority, however, considered that increasing taxes was not the appro- 
priate way to attain this goal. An agreement between the government and the 
main opposition party, Renovacih Nacional (RN), enabled the legislative ap- 
proval of the tax reform law. 
The tax package included, among other measures, a change in corporate 
taxation, whose tax base went from only distributed earnings to total earnings, 
as was the case until  1988. Its rate was increased from 10% to  15% for the 
period  1991-93.  This increase in corporate taxation was explicitly said to be 
transitory in the tax reform project sent to Congress by  the executive, as a 
result of a previous negotiation with RN. 
17. Direct foreign investment amounted to US$I.l billion in 1990, a 26% increase with respect 
to 1989 and a record high for the country. On average, direct foreign investment was in the order 
of  1.6% of GDP in the 1980s, compared with about 4.5% in 1990-91. 
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Personal income taxes19 were raised by narrowing the income tax brackets 
but  without  touching  tax  rates-the  highest  marginal rate continues to be 
SO%-and  the value-added tax (VAT) was increased from 16% to 18% (VAT 
had been 20% during most of  the military regime and was reduced to 16% 
only in 1988). Both of these tax increases were permanent in the government 
project; as a result of the negotiation in Congress, however, they were raised 
transitorily until 1994. 
Additionally, the corporate tax base for “large” agricultural, transportation, 
and mining companies was changed from presumed income to effective in- 
come, leaving the option to chose among both tax bases for small companies 
in these activities. 
It is estimated that the tax reform package raised fiscal revenue by  some 
US$SOO  million annually, or almost 2.7%  of  1991 GDP, and the government 
was committed to spend all these extra resources in social programs. 
Critics argued that the tax reform would reduce investment, but evidence in 
this respect does not support their claim. A drop in investment from 20.2% of 
GDP in  1990 to 18.8% in 1991 can be mostly attributed to a lagged response 
to the contractionary monetary policy of  1990. As mentioned, investment is 
expected to reach a record level of over 21 % of GDP in  1992. 
In other countries, the corporate tax rate fluctuates between 20% and SO% 
and cannot be used as a credit against personal income taxes, as it is the case 
in Chile. Additionally, the majority of these countries do not offer preferential 
treatment for retained earnings. In some cases, such as Germany and Japan, 
the situation is just the opposite: retained earnings are taxed at a higher rate 
than distributed  earnings, as a way  to favor the intermediation  of  resources 
through capital markets. 
Small and medium-sized companies, however, may have been hurt by  the 
increased cost of using retained earnings to finance investment brought by the 
tax reform, because of  their restricted access to financial markets. To offset 
part of this effect, the reform allowed firms to discount up to 2% of the value of 
new productive investment from their corporate tax base, as a way to stimulate 
investment independently of  its financing. Its low rate (2%) and a maximum 
deduction of about US$16,000 of 1990, however, made the effect of this incen- 
tive quite marginal. 
There are also good arguments for a positive effect of the tax reform on 
investment. First of  all, the increase was quite moderate and still leaves Chile 
as one of the countries with the lowest rate of corporate taxation. Second, the 
government made a commitment not to pursue further tax increases during its 
tenure after this reform was approved. Third, increased  spending in  health, 
education, and nutrition is also a form of investment, as it will likely mean 
improved human capital over the medium to long term. And last, an increase 
19. The so-called global complementurio tax, whose base adds up personal income from all 
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in social spending, if used efficiently, would allow a larger proportion of Chil- 
eans to feel the benefits of the economic model, thereby increasing the popular 
support for policy continuity, which is expected to have a positive impact on 
private investment. 
Other critics argued that an increase in the VAT  would raise inflation and 
thus would have a regressive social impact. The reform, however, did not have 
an important negative effect on inflation. It is true that the VAT  has a propor- 
tionately greater effect on lower-income families who consume a higher share 
of their income, but to evaluate the impact of a higher VAT  on the poor, one 
needs to take into account also the share of  higher spending-which  this tax 
increase allowed-transferred  to these families. 
More than a year before the programmed reduction of the different tax rates 
increased in 1990, an important debate arose between the government and the 
opposition concerning the convenience  of maintaining the current tax rates. 
The government is in favor of maintaining the tax reform, arguing that it is not 
possible to sustain the pattern of public spending already committed (a large 
part of which is permanent) and at the same time reduce the tax rates in 1994 
without generating a fiscal deficit. The opposition is in favor of reducing the 
tax rates, on the grounds that the expansion in economic activity over the last 
couple of years allows for a reduction in tax rates while maintaining the social 
spending effort and without generating a significant fiscal deficit. 
4.3.3  Reforms to Labor Legislation 
By the end of  1990, a broad agreement had been reached about the need to 
introduce changes in labor legislation. The government had two major goals 
with this reform. On the one hand, it aimed to balance negotiating power be- 
tween employers and employees, which the authorities considered to be biased 
in favor of employers. On the other hand, the government wanted to legitimize 
the labor legislation. 
As mentioned  earlier, the labor reform implemented  in  1979 was largely 
opposed by  workers. Their  main  criticisms were that it (1) repressed  labor 
unions,20  (2)  restricted collective bargaining, (3) biased the relative bargaining 
power  against  workers,*’ and  (4) allowed  for arbitrary  dismissal-workers 
could be dismissed without expression of cause and without appeal-and  for 
a low severance payment. 
The reform that was finally approved by Congress represented an intermedi- 
ate position between the old law and the original project of the executive, as the 
20. During the 1980s, the unionization rate in Chile was only  1 I%, compared to 18% during 
1965-70  and 29% during 1971-73.  This rate is much higher in developed countries. In Denmark 
and Sweden, for example, this rate is around 85-89%;  in Belgium, 70-7  9%; in the United King- 
dom, 40-49%;  in Germany, Italy, and Canada, 30-39%;  in Japan, 20-29%;  in the United States, 
France and Spain, 15-19%  (Ramos and Bravo 1992). 
21. This law established that strikes should have a maximum duration of sixty days. If the strike 
was not over after sixty days, the contracts of  striking workers were automatically terminated, 
losing them not only their jobs but also their severance payments. 137  Chile: Continuity, Change, and Transition 
government had to negotiate it with the main opposition party. This negotiation 
helped to moderate the reform. 
The labor reform eliminated the right of employers to fire workers with no 
expression of cause, but allowed a general cause of  “needs of the company.” 
Severance payments remained at one month of salary per year of work in the 
company, but the maximum was increased from five to eleven monthsz2  (there 
was no maximum in the original reform project) and workers could appeal in 
court. In case firing was declared unjustified by the courts, the severance pay- 
ment had to be raised by 20%. Additionally,  severance payments in case of 
firing from the seventh year on can now be substituted (by agreement of  the 
parts) for an all-event payment; that is, severance can be paid if the worker is 
fired or if he or she quits. 
The other reforms  to the labor law  applied  to collective bargaining  and 
unionization. Groups of nonunionized workers were allowed to participate in 
collective bargaining,  and negotiations started to be allowed at the industry 
level only by common agreement between employers and employees. Before 
the reform, negotiations were allowed only at the firm  level. The reform also 
eliminated the prohibition to form union associations, extended the objectives 
of  union  organizations, gave more protection to labor unions, and increased 
the financing of union activities. On the other hand, the new legislation elimi- 
nated the maximum of sixty days for strikes, leaving them without limit. 
Critics said that the labor reform would increase strike activity, push up real 
wages beyond productivity, and maybe raise unempl~yrnent.~~  The evidence, 
however, points the other way, Days lost to strikes have declined since the re- 
form, and the unemployment rate declined to around 4.5% by the end of 1992, 
the lowest in more than two decades. Also, initial real wage adjustments in 
collective bargaining processes have been moderate and declined from around 
4% in  1990 to an average of 2.5% for the period January 1991 to September 
1992 (see table 4.6). 
4.3.4  Trade Policy and Integration to the World Economyz4 
Since the mid-1970s, Chile has pursued a strategy of global trade liberaliza- 
tion, aiming to integrate the country into the world economy without making 
any distinctions among countries or regions. This strategy has been immensely 
successful. Chile’s trade has been greatly diversified, both in terms of  the com- 
position of exports and in terms of trading partners. Asia, Latin America, and 
North America now account each for about 20% of Chile’s exports, and Europe 
for 30%. Copper, which accounted for almost 80% of  Chile’s exports in the 
22. The idea was to give dismissed workers enough income to subsist during the average unem- 
ployment period (8 months); this is important because Chile lacks an unemployment insurance 
program. 
23. Jost Pifiera, for example, minister of  labor during the military regime, stated that the labor 
reform meant “putting a loaded gun in the hand of  unions.” 
24. For further details on this topic, see Larrain and Assael (1992). 138  Raul Laban and Felipe Larrain 
Table 4.6  Initial Real Wage Adjustments Agreed to in Collective 
Bargaining (70) 
















































Source: Annual Report to Congress delivered by  the President of the Central Bank of Chile. 
early 1970s, is now down to less than 40% of total exports in spite of increased 
production from new private mines. Overall, exports have increased dramati- 
cally. From about 15% of  GDP in 1965, exports are now over 35% of GDP, a 
ratio similar to that of South Korea. Chile is today the most open economy of 
Latin America. And the export sector has become the main engine of economic 
growth in the country. 
In spite of this success, the country is now pursuing free trade agreements 
(FTAs) with  several  countries  of  the  continent.  An  FTA  has  already  been 
signed with Mexico, which establishes a gradual decline in bilateral tariffs to 
0% in 1996, and an elimination of  all nontariff barriers. Soon Chile is likely to 
sign  similar agreements  with Colombia and  Venezuela,  and it is second to 
Mexico in progress toward an FTA with the United States. 
Chile has not abandoned the goal of  global trade integration. In fact, the 
country’s flat import tariff was unilaterally cut from 15%  to 11% in June 1991; 
furthermore, there are no nontariff barriers. But the trade strategy has shifted 
emphasis toward bilateral agreements, provided that they do not result in in- 
creased barriers with the outside world.25 
There are several reasons for the emphasis on FTAs. First, it responds to a 
worldwide phenomenon, the prospect of large trading blocks in Europe (and 
maybe in Asia), and to the U.S.  Initiative for the Americans. Although it might 
not be optimal for a country like Chile to sign FTAs if other countries were not 
25. This is one complicated aspect of  MERCOSUR, which is a customs union  (not an FTA) 
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following this strategy, it may be optimal to do so if the world is moving toward 
the formation of  FTAs (Krugman 1991). Second, although global free trade is 
recognized as the first best, there is growing frustration with slow progress in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) multilateral negotiations. 
Third, if a country intends to liberalize trade anyway, bilateral agreements are 
a way to obtain something in return, especially when starting from low tariff 
levels and no nontariff  barriers.  Nonetheless, FTAs must be understood as a 
complement, not a substitute, of trade integration with the world economy. 
To deepen  its  integration in  the  world  economy,  Chile needs  to gain in- 
creased market access, especially in developed countries. FTAs may cooperate 
in this task. The net welfare implications of bilateralism are ambiguous, and 
mainly depend on the characteristics  of  the  integration partners  and on the 
international context in which the FTA is carried out. The different costs and 
benefits of this type of strategy should be taken into account when choosing 
trading partners.  A recent  empirical  evaluation of  an FTA  with the  United 
States (Coeymans and Larrain  1992) shows important gains to Chile of such 
an agreement, especially on the investment front. 
Chile is currently evaluating an important number of FTAs (with the United 
States, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Argentina, 
among others), but the country lacks a well-specified trade strategy vis-a-vis 
FTAs.  This  leads  to  excessive  arbitrariness  in  the  evaluation  of  such 
agreements and to increased uncertainty on the relative profitability of differ- 
ent productive  activities,  which could have a negative impact on investment 
and growth. 
4.4  Investment, Saving, and the Needs for Sustained Growth 
One of the central challenges for Chile is to consolidate  a stable path of 
strong economic growth. A low and highly volatile growth rate has character- 
ized the Chilean economy  for many  decades. The average growth rate was 
4.9% in the  1960s, 2.5% in the  1970s, and 3.6% during the 1980s. And the 
country has suffered two major recessions (1975 and 1982-83)  with output 
contractions of up to 15%. A major improvement has occurred since the mid- 
1980s, when the average expansion rate reached a record of 6% for the period 
1985-92,  the highest in the Latin American region over the same period. 
Sustained growth is the only way  to defeat poverty permanently. It is also 
the way to avoid destabilizing social conflict. Strong distributive pressures in a 
stagnant society are bound to prove explosive. Thus, redistributive policies can 
succeed  beyond  the  short run  only  in  a  growing  economy.  Lower-income 
groups have suffered the most with the instability that has characterized Chile’s 
growth process over the last two decades. The challenge then is to attain higher 
rates of economic growth and to reduce its volatility, which, to a large extent, 
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4.4.1 
The Necessaiy Investment Effort 
Higher economic growth over the medium term requires increased rates of 
accumulation  of  productive  factors-both  physical  and  human-and  im- 
proved efficiency. This is not necessarily  true in the short run, however. The 
country can rely on available unutilized capacity to expand production even 
with relatively low levels of investment, as happened in the second half of the 
1980s. But  this  has  a limit. When  the  utilization  rate approaches  capacity, 
strong economic  expansions get translated into an  acceleration  of  inflation 
(e.g., 1981 and 1989) unless accompanied by a stronger investment effort. And 
when the external constraint is the dominant restriction, an effort to grow faster 
in the short run leads to a balance-of-payments crisis (e.g., 1971). 
Investment  has  recovered  strongly  since  the  mid-1980s  (in  1983 it  was 
barely enough to cover depreciation), and by  1992 it is expected to be around 
2 1  % of GDP, with capital formation projected at about 20% of GDP. It is clear 
to most analysts, however, that capacity utilization has reached its upper lim- 
its.?h  Moreover, Chile cannot expect to obtain the efficiency gains of structural 
transformation or the benefits of  stabilization, because  structural adjustment 
has been completed and the economy is already stable. The labor market is 
now quite tight, and unemployment declined to about 4.5% by the end of  1992, 
the lowest  in two decades. Thus, investment has become a major constraint 
on growth. 
If  Chile wants to increase its output at a rate of 6%  to 7% per year, it will 
be necessary to increase capital formation at between 24% and 25% of GDP, 
assuming that  this  is done  very  efficiently. A  brief  examination  of  various 
countries that experienced high growth in the 1970s and 1980s shows that their 
investment efforts are substantially higher than Chile’s. To achieve average an- 
nual growth rates of almost 7% to 9% over the last two decades, Korea, Malay- 
sia, Singapore, and Thailand had rates of capital formation between 25% and 
40% of GDP. 
Some people argue that the Chilean economy is so efficient that it can grow 
at 7% consistently with the current levels of investment. This is, on our view, 
overly optimistic. Average ICORs (incremental capital output ratios) in those 
four Asian countries have been between 2 in Thailand and 3.2 in Singapore. In 
the past, however, the efficiency of investment in Chile has been lower than 
this, and only in the last few years has efficiency improved markedly. Chile’s 
average ICOR during  1985-91  was  2.4?’  Using this, and a depreciation of 
between 7% and 8% of GDP, the country’s fixed investment rate would need 
to be between 24% and 25% of GDP to grow at 6%  to 7% per year. If Chile’s 
The Role of Investment and Saving 
26. See, for example, Marfin (1992). 
27. This period is favorable to use to calculate the ICOR, as it includes the recovery from a 
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investment efficiency reaches Korea’s (ICOR = 2.  I), fixed investment should 
be between 22.4% and 23.4% of GDP to attain the same goal. 
Thus, the extra investment effort needed in Chile to grow at 6%  to 7% annu- 
ally on a consistent basis is around 4 points of GDP. In 1992, however, the 
economy grew at over 9% with fixed investment of almost 20% of GDP. The 
discussion above indicates that this performance cannot be sustained. This is 
the view of the authorities, too. The Central Bank’s annual report to the Senate 
and the minister of finance states that, “in spite of a dynamic investment during 
1992, it is not considered feasible for Chile to sustain growth rates of over 6% 
per year.”2X  According to Marfin (1  992), the national saving and investment 
observed in the last couple of years will allow for a sustainable annual expan- 
sion of productive capacity on the order of 5.5%. 
To some people, aggregate numbers look a bit intangible, and it is perhaps 
useful to mention two areas where anybody living in Chile could feel a deficit 
of  investment. One of them is productive infrastructure. The fiscal budget for 
1992 stipulated a real increase of 18.9%  for public investment in infrastructure, 
and the budgetary law for 1993, just sent to Congress, includes a similar in- 
crease in this area. The accumulated (stock) deficit in infrastructure, however, 
due to low levels of investment in the last decade, and the necessary  (flow) 
effort required to sustain high rates of growth, makes the current effort of the 
government in this area insufficient. The government has opened the possibil- 
ity for the private sector to invest in major infrastructure projects, and the re- 
forms to capital markets (discussed below) will help this initiative, but private 
participation in this area is likely to be marginal.29  Another area where a deficit 
of investment is clearly visible is the protection of the environment. 
Without adequate incentives, the private sector would tend to underinvest in 
these two areas, and thus requires constant assistance from the government 
(direct investment and/or subsidies). At present, Chile does not have the right 
mechanisms to induce the private sector toward the level of investment that is 
socially optimum in these areas. It is necessary to design schemes that would 
promote private infrastructure  investment, and that would  induce the private 
sector to internalize the social costs (benefits) associated with the destruction 
(protection) of the en~ironment.~~ 
The increased  overall  investment effort is sizable and cannot be accom- 
plished in one year. For more than a decade, the main obstacle to increased 
investment and economic growth in Chile was the foreign constraint. Today 
this is no longer the bottleneck  to economic development, and the prospects 
28. Banco Central de Chile, “Evoluci6n de la Economii en  1992 y Perspectivas para  1993,” 
annual report to Congress delivered by the President, September 1992. 
29. The magnitudes involved are huge, and the law restricts private investments to new projects 
where an alternative exists for the users. 
30. The new concessions law allows the private sector to build and operate public works. Since 
its approval in mid-1992, however, there has not yet been one project in operation through this 
law. The first one-a  major tunnel-is  expected to be approved this December. 142  Raul Laban and Felipe Larrain 
for sustained growth now rest on the country's capacity to increase productive 
investment. Nevertheless,  the experience of  Chile and other countries of the 
region  in the  early  1980s suggests that a massive  and short-lived  inflow of 
foreign capital induces strong real appreciations of  the local currency and a 
deterioration of the trade balance. Given the need to preserve export dynamism 
and thus to maintain a competitive real exchange rate, foreign saving must be 
used prudently. Thus, the bulk of the required increase in saving will have to 
come from domestic savings. 
National Saving and Foreign Saving 
At present, Chile can finance sustainably a current account deficit of 3% to 
4% of GDP, as an upper limit. This is consistent with expected medium- and 
long-term capital inflows, and with the experience of successful Asian econo- 
mies following an outward-oriented economic strategy.7' An attempt to go be- 
yond this level, although possible to finance in the short term, would probably 
be unsustainable. On the one hand, it is unlikely that foreigners would be will- 
ing to finance such a current account gap over the medium to long term. On 
the other hand, it may threaten the expansion of the export sector, the engine 
of economic growth, because it would likely require an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate at a rate higher than what can be offset by productivity gains. If 
this  happens,  a negative  impact on aggregate  investment  is  almost certain, 
given the larger opportunities offered by world markets relative to domestic 
markets. 
National saving has been chronically low in Chile, even more so than invest- 
ment. This is the case whether one compares Chile with industrialized econo- 
mies or with other middle-income countries. During the 1970s, and especially 
in the early 1980s, saving was clearly insufficient to finance domestic invest- 
ment. The gap was translated into significant current account deficits, reaching 
a record of  14% of GDP in 1981. The recovery of saving from the lows of the 
1982 depression  has  been  impressive,  and  by  1991 gross  national  saving 
reached 19% of GDP. Yet in that year foreign saving was negative (there was 
a current account surplus). For 1992,  gross national saving is expected to reach 
around 19.5%. If Chile is able to attract and digest foreign saving of about 3% 
of GDP, the extra national saving effort would be around 2.5 points of GDP. 
This would finance inventory accumulation assumed at 1  % of GDP per year, 
and fixed investment  of  24% of GDP that would allow the country to grow 
consistently at a rate of 6% to 7% per year. 
Increased national saving has been the result of higher public and private 
saving. The nonfinancial public sector saving rate attained an average of 7.1  % 
of GDP during 1990-91  compared to 5.3% in the  1980s. On the other hand, 
the private saving rate reached 12.8% during 1990-91,  which almost doubles 
31. Larrain and Vergara (1993)  study the cases of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, where average 
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that for the 1980s (7.0%).  At the same time the government has contributed to 
reduce the quasi-fiscal deficit of the Central Bank, as mentioned earlier, which 
is an important source of national dissaving. 
It would be desirable to achieve a significant increase in public saving to 
support the national saving effort. But one could not count on it, given the 
significant pressures to expand social spending, and the commitments that the 
government has already made in this area. Thus, it is likely that the bulk of 
the extra saving effort would have to fall on the private sector. 
Reforms to Domestic Capital Markets 
A higher contribution of private saving to finance investment can be accom- 
plished both by  stimulating the private saving effort and by  more efficient 
channeling of private saving to investment. Two of the major sources of domes- 
tic  saving in Chile are pension  funds and life insurance  companies.  As of 
March 1992, these institutional investors had accumulated resources of US$15 
billion, about 45% of GDP, which are expected to grow to 100% of GDP by 
the end of the decade. To attain adequate profitability and low risk, a further 
diversification of their portfolio-now  constrained by strict rules-is  needed. 
This requires a larger number of eligible financial instruments (creating new 
ones and increasing eligibility among those available), which would also in- 
crease the availability of medium-term domestic financing for investment proj- 
ects. This goal has been partially accomplished by allowing pension funds to 
invest in new projects, which was previously banned. Three months after hav- 
ing developed such a mechanism, some important mining and infrastructure 
projects that used to be financed with external borrowing are completing the 
necessary  studies that  will  allow  them  to place US$200 million  in  bonds 
among local institutional investors. 
On the other hand, the government will soon send to Congress a project 
aimed at the modernization and deepening of the Chilean financial system. Its 
goals are to diversify the investment portfolio of institutional investors, to im- 
prove the regulation of pension funds, to strengthen the autoregulation mecha- 
nisms in the capital market, and to develop new financial instruments to chan- 
nel private saving to investment projects. It contemplates the creation of bonds 
and funds for project financing, mortgage-backed bonds for the financing of 
housing, and the development of other types of securitization. 
Labor Markets, Export Incentives, and Other Constraints to Growth 
The tightening of the labor market-especially  of skilled labor-suggests 
that, in contrast to what has been traditionally the case in Chile, labor may 
become a binding constraint to economic growth, maybe even more restrictive 
than domestic and foreign saving. 
Additionally, given the central role of exports in Chile’s development strat- 
egy and the difficulties experienced over the last two years in maintaining the 
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sector and efficient import substitution industries will have to come from in- 
creased productivity. At present, a major objective is to improve the technolog- 
ical content and increase the value added of Chile’s export supply. A highly 
trained labor force will be essential for this. 
Chile’s educational system, however, does not appear suited to accomplish 
this goal. At present, it is not preparing the kind of workers the economy is 
demanding, which may help to explain why the youth unemployment rate is 
almost twice the average rate. Thus, a reform to the educational system, and 
more  and better training  programs  to improve labor productivity,  should be 
given more attention in the near future.’? 
4.4.2  Vulnerability of the Growth Rate to External Shocks 
To attain sustainable growth, the Chilean economy would also need to re- 
duce its vulnerability to external shocks in commodity and financial markets. 
Since the mid-l980s, progress has stepped up in this respect. 
The traditional transmission mechanism of external shocks is a drop in the 
trade of goods (or, equivalently, in the terms of trade) and a surge in the service 
of external debt. Since 1985, Chile has reduced the absolute level and relative 
burden of the external debt. More recently, public foreign debt has declined 
quite rapidly, generating space for external  borrowing  by  the private sector 
while continuing the reduction in the debt burden. In 1992, the external debt 
to GDP ratio will be around 46%,  which is the lowest in the last ten years.33  At 
the  same time,  foreign  direct  investment has grown  substantially  in  recent 
years, reaching an average of nearly 4% of GDP in the 1990s. Precise measures 
of the stock of domestic capital in the hands of foreigners are unavailable, but 
the large capital gains in the stock market and the reinvestment of profits sug- 
gest that it has increased significantly. Although it is difficult to estimate total 
net Chilean  liabilities with the rest  of  the world, their proportion  of  debt to 
equity has declined. And foreign investment appears to have better properties 
than foreign credits during the cycle (Larrain and Velasco 1990). 
Nowadays,  the contribution  of foreign saving to financing Chilean invest- 
ment is much smaller than in the past. While in the 1980s this source of saving 
accounted on average for over 40% of total investment, it accounted for only 
1.3% of total saving in 1990-92. 
Chile’s vulnerability to external shocks has been further reduced by the sig- 
nificant increase in export diversification, both in terms of goods and in the 
destination markets. Noncopper shipments represented 37% and 54% of total 
exports in the  1970s and  1980s, respectively; they account today for 62% of 
exports. The geographic  diversification of  exports has also increased;  trade 
with Asia, for example, has surged to 20% of total trade. Higher availability of 
32. Increased labor productivity can also be attained by  labor reallocation from less to more 
33. This coefficient was 81% on average during the 1980s. 
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foreign reserves  in the Central Bank  also helps to cushion against external 
shocks. While these reserves  allowed the financing  of  seven months  of im- 
ports-on  average-during  the  1980s, in  1992 they represented a whole year 
of imports, or a quarter of GDP. 
The lower vulnerability of the Chilean economy is evident from its vigorous 
behavior of the last two years, in an international context characterized by low 
growth and slow expansion of  trade. While in the  1990-91  world trade ex- 
panded at an average rate of only 3.1 %,  Chile’s total trade increased by 7.5%. 
And world income will have grown at an average rate of  1.2%  in  1990-92, 
compared to 5.6% in Chile. 
Chile has also increased its degree of  integration to international financial 
markets, which also helps to reduce the vulnerability of the economy to exter- 
nal  shocks.  On  the  one  hand,  the  international  diversification  of  Chilean 
assets-for  example,  the  investment  abroad  of  pension  funds  allowed  in 
1991-should  contribute to reduce the variability of returns, and thus the vola- 
tility of national income. At the same time, external borrowing allows smooth- 
ing the impact of transitory external shocks, distributing its impact over time 
and thus allowing for a more stable consumption path. 
A tighter integration with world capital markets allows for a more efficient 
allocation of capital and for risk diversification, but it imposes new challenges 
for a small economy like Chile. Higher international capital mobility puts strict 
limits on short-term stabilization policy  if  the country wants to avoid large 
fluctuations in the real exchange rate. 
How effective monetary  and fiscal policy are in this context depends im- 
portantly on the prevailing exchange rate arrangement. The fact that fiscal pol- 
icy is-at  least in the short term-less  flexible than monetary policy favors a 
flexible  exchange  rate.  But  the  central  role played  by  the  export  sector  in 
Chile’s development strategy and the fact that short-term excess exchange rate 
volatility can have permanent effects on the pattern of trade (Krugman 1987) 
and investment (Pindyck, 1991) favor the protection of tradables from short- 
term variability. Chile now follows a target zone system with  amplitude of 
+- 10%. To protect against real appreciation, the center of the exchange rate’s 
fluctuation band is adjusted by the difference of domestic inflation and an esti- 
mate of external inflation. This arrangement results in partial effectiveness of 
both monetary and fiscal policy. 
Chile, like several other Latin American economies, has experienced lately 
difficulties in managing domestic stabilization policy in a context of large capi- 
tal mobility and extremely low international interest rates-inconsistent  with 
internal equilibrium (Calvo et al. 1992). This has resulted in increased invest- 
ment spending, deterioration of  the trade balance,  appreciation of the local 
currency and the stock market, accumulation of  external reserves in order to 
prevent further currency appreciation, and a need for sterilization to avoid the 
inflationary  impact of massive purchases of  foreign reserves  by  the Central 
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and  the  requirement  of  maintaining  high  real interest  rates,  which  attract 
more capital. 
In the last year the government has carried out a number of  measures di- 
rected to increase the degree of autonomy in domestic economic policy. First, 
it has increased the width of the exchange rate band from 25%  to 5 lo%,  thus 
buying more independence for monetary policy. Second, it has moved to peg 
the exchange rate to a basket of currencies that includes the U.S. dollar, the 
yen and the  deutsche mark, rather than only to the U.S. dollar; this makes 
the relevant international mix of economic policy a combination of fiscal and 
monetary policy in Germany, the United States, and Japan, which results in a 
higher average international interest rate than the U.S. policy mix alone. Third, 
it has adopted taxes and reserve requirements to foreign credits, increasing the 
“relevant” international interest rate and thus allowing Chile to keep a domes- 
tic interest rate consistent with internal equilibrium. 
4.5  Conclusions: Continuity, Change, and Future Challenges for the 
Chilean Economy 
Chile’s economic performance in democracy during the 1990s has been out- 
standing. The economy is in its ninth uninterrupted year of growth, unemploy- 
ment is below 5% (the lowest in more than two decades), inflation has declined 
to less than  13%, and the external position of the country is extremely solid. 
These achievements have occurred during a transition  from military rule to 
democracy, in an international environment of very low growth and depressed 
international trade. 
Many reasons account for this  success. The strong initial position  of the 
economy at the end of  the  1980s, with macroeconomic  stability and a com- 
pleted structural transformation, was no doubt a crucial asset. Another major 
factor is a broad political consensus on economic  matters.  Of course, good 
initial conditions and broad consensus are necessary but not sufficient condi- 
tions. Highly responsible and well-oriented conduct by the economic authori- 
ties also deserves much credit. 
In the end, we found more continuity than change in the economic policies 
applied during the current regime. This is not meant as a criticism. The sensible 
thing was to preserve most of the economic policies of the previous regime, 
while  significantly  improving  the  social  effort,  thus  legitimizing  the  free- 
market economic model.  Therefore, we regard  the tax and labor reforms as 
important, positive, and moderate policy changes. 
Despite a very healthy economic outlook, however, there are still substantial 
challenges ahead for the country. The first one is the consolidation of a strong 
and stable economic growth path. Second is the elimination of poverty, a con- 
dition that still affects some 40% of the Chilean population. Succeeding  in 
this goal will take time even with the best policies. But it clearly requires the 
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possible  in  a  stagnant  or  slowly  growing  economy.  Reducing  inflation  to 
single-digit rates has also become a widely shared objective, and it is a feasible 
option within the next two years. A more ambitious goal of  achieving world 
inflation rates looks feasible only in the medium term. 
To  maintain high rates of  growth it is necessary to increase Chile’s invest- 
ment effort. Capital formation has been growing strongly since the mid-l980s, 
and in 1992 it is expected to reach around 20% of  GDP. This is healthy, but 
still insufficient to maintain rates of output growth of  6%  to 7% per year on a 
consistent basis. Higher investment can count on foreign saving, but this source 
faces limits. In 1992, Chile will run a current account deficit of about 1.5% of 
GDP, which will likely double in 1993. Foreign saving of  up to 3% to 4% of 
GDP per year is sustainable in an economy such as Chile. Thus, higher invest- 
ment would require more domestic saving. The country’s national saving rate 
in 1991 was 19% of GDP, and in 1992 will likely rise a bit. It is necessary to 
increase it between 2 and 3 points to support investment rates of around 25% 
of GDP. 
A new challenge for Chile is the preservation of the environment. The worst 
environmental problem is air pollution in Santiago, which has so far been ap- 
proached with half measures like a circulation restriction for 20% of all vehi- 
cles during weekdays. (Since September 1992, however, new cars imported or 
sold in Chile must have a catalytic converter.) Industries in certain areas also 
have maximum emission standards for toxic wastes. A comprehensive solution 
to the problem of air pollution, however, is estimated to cost over half a billion 
dollars and so far has not been  tried. The preservation of  species has been 
approached with special laws that regulate fishing and the exploitation of for- 
ests and native woods. For the first time, comprehensive environmental legisla- 
tion is about to be approved by Congress. 
Another challenge for the country is deepening its integration into the world 
economy in trade of goods, services, and capital. To  this end, the country uni- 
laterally reduced import tariffs from 15% to 11% in 1991, and is studying a 
number of FTAs that may help Chile gain access to some important markets. 
Bilateral deals, however, should be viewed as a complement to global liberal- 
ization, as the ultimate goal is to integrate Chile with the world as a whole. 
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